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Abstract: Objectives: For the European Union, the principle of subsidiarity is associated with the 
principle of proportionality, credited with maintaining the balance between the interests of Member 
States and those of European Union. This study aims to analyze the principle of
failures of EU and analyze the conditions which bring under regulation the implementation of this 
principle. The essay also examines interdisciplinary the impact of the implementation of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportional
work: I’ve tried to find and debate hermeneutical new regulations and doctrinal opinions in this 
domain very important for those who practice international public law. 
and Member States, the enforcement of principles of law is viewed with great interest, being 
considered sources of law. Value
of the problem raised by appliance of subsidiarity and proportio
national level. 
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1. Introduction  
The independence and sovereignty of Member States are a concernment within the 
relations established between the
principle of subsidiarity had not been initiated since the beginnings of European 
construction, but was regulated much later, considering it the key to many 
problems which the European Communities faced. Thus, w
subsidiarity is a mechanism which aims to severely restrict the European powers in 
order to protect the sovereignty of countries.
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The idea of subsidiarity was extensively underlined by the social doctrine of the 
Church and afterwards by the German constitutional law. The subsidiarity 
embodies a support which was granted by the higher communities to the nether 
ones, without replacing these in terms of powers and duties (Duculescu: 2004, p. 
47). 
 
2. Teoretical Approach of Sovereignty 
The principle of subsidiarity features a pattern of contiguity political structure 
which combines the large requirement of sovereignty with the respect towards 
autonomy, being the one to take on the diversities of European Union and the 
simultaneous aims to enlarge and deepen the European integration process and to 
preserve the sovereignty of Members States,   whereas the idea of subsidiarity is 
built on acceptance of a pluralistic society (Velișcu:2004, p. 174). The subsidiarity 
provides an array for the division of powers between different levels of authority. 
The principle of subsidiarity is automatically linked to the exercise of power at 
different levels of decision making. In fact, the European institutions bring into 
existence a supranational power in order to cope with problems that states cannot 
solve alone.  
Pausing the analysis of the principle of subsidiarity, Jean Louis Clergerie states: 
“subsidiarity is the origin of many debates antagonizing those for whom it allows 
to take decisions closest to the citizens of which it, on the contrary, allows further 
tightening Eurocrats’ powers in Brussels. It is true that it is rather a philosophical 
concept, not legal, which remains difficult to assess both in terms of content and its 
consequences” (Clergerie:1997, p.5).  
Analyzing the content and role of subsidiarity within European regulations, we 
believe that we are facing a inferentially apprehended subsidiarity in the content of 
Treaties establishing the European Communities and practice of the Court of 
Justice in Luxembourg, and we can discuss on the explicitly subsidiarity within the 
european regulations encated after the Maastricht Treaty.  
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3. The Aplicability of the Principle of Subsdiarity and Principle of 
Proportionality within the Activity of European Union  
The principle of subsidiarity was officially introduced into European Law by the 
Maastricht Treaty, wherein the preamble approves: “The decision to continue the 
process of creating an endless Union and much more congregate among the people 
of Europe, in which decisions may be as much as possible taken by citizens, 
according to the principle of subsidiarity”1.  
Art. 3-B of the Maastricht Treaty provides the following: “The Community shall 
act within the limits of the powers conferred by the Treaty and of the objectives 
that have been set”.  
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall 
take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity only if and as far as the 
objectives of the suggested action cannot be satisfactorily met by the Member 
States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the considered action, 
be better achieved by the Community.  
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of this Treaty”. 
The enunciation of the second paragraph of this article reflects a difficult 
compromise between the positions of Germany and Great Britain. Germans 
suggested to define subsidiarity in terms of effectiveness, so that the community 
would take action that could be better accomplished or achieved at supranational 
level. On the other hand, the British insisted that the Community’s actions should 
be undertaken only when necessary or essential to achieve that objective. 
Effectiveness and necessity are different motivations and, on principle, one does 
not involve the other. Some actions may be necessary in order to meet certain 
objectives of the Treaty (inclusively some political objectives) however without 
being effective (if efficiency is estimated in terms of a precise economic criteria). 
Also, some actions can be effective without being strictly necessary. The final 
enunciation of the text includes both elements and seems to suggest that, if an 
                                               
1
 In his speech in Maastricht on 7 February 1992, at the signing of the Treaty of the European Union, 
Jacques Delors, the President of the European Commission, said: “Subsidiarity is not a limiting 
intervention to a higher authority towards a person or a community able to act itself, it is also an 
obligation on the authority to act towards a given person or community so as to provide the means to 
achieve that objective”  
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action objectives cannot be achieved by Member States, the Community’s 
intervention is expected to be more efficient1.  
The introduction of the principle of proportionality in the text of this article is 
intended to limit Community action since it is limited to not go beyond what is 
necessary in order to achieve the objectives of the Treaty. Recently, some Member 
States have made use of this principle to limit the Commission’s involvement in 
the concrete implementation of its policies. As France, Germany and Great Britain 
who dispute the Commission’s role in setting priorities and monitoring 
dysfunctions in the implementation of regional policy within regions of industrial 
decline2.  
Whilst within the framework of national law the implementation of the principle of 
proportionality is present on matters such as expropriation, self-defense, excess 
power and so on, in European law it embraces various functions related to the 
bounds European powers and the means by which they are achieved.  
In European law, the principle of proportionality is to identify the substance and 
meaning of the fundamental freedoms appointed by the constitutive treaties, being 
complementary to principles of justice and equity. The principle of proportionality 
is of great importance in the protection of the individual, given its role as 
“guarantor of substance” relating the fundamental rights protected  
(Alexandru:2005, p. 221). 
The European Court of Justice, when assessing the legalism of a measure in the  
light of the principle of proportionality, is less reclined to make distinctions 
according to the manner and form of action undertaken by the referred authority 
(Schwartze:1992, p. 862). 
The enunciation of the principle of subsidiarity is not explicit in terms of defining 
of exclusive competence. If a strict legal interpretation is followed, these powers 
                                               
1
 The Commission reversed this logic, suggesting that if an action is more effective at Community’s 
level, the objectives of the given action would be better achieved, so that action is needed at 
Community level (see Commission comment AE 1804/5). The Commission also expressed the view 
that the principle of subsidiarity does not affect the mechanisms by which powers are allocated to the 
Community. In other words, according to the Commission, the principle does not conflict with use or 
teleological interpretation of Article 235 of the Treaty. The Commission takes the view that the 
principle simply regulates, how distributed powers are exercised.   
2
 Edinburgh European Council (11-12 December 1992) estimated at the request of the states that do 
not want to give the sovereignty, that the proportionality principle regards the exclusive and the 
competitive powers.  
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will be limited to commercial policy and the protection of the sea. Commission 
fostered, however, a broader interpretation (in AE 1804/5) according to which the 
exclusive powers are corresponding to the four freedoms (free movement of goods, 
capital, services and people) involved. Therefore, the Commission suggested that 
the barriers removal for movement of goods, capital, services and persons (Article 
8), as policies which are upshot of the four freedoms, including trade policy, 
competition policy, organization of agricultural markets, protection of sea and 
transport policy belong to the exclusive competence and hence not subject to the 
principle of subsidiarity. However, they are nevertheless accepted as subject of the 
principle of proportionality. 
The creators of the Maastricht Treaty did not explicitly established the principle as 
a tool for the allotment and exercise of powers, without having a list of specific 
areas where Community action might be necessary and effective. Consequently, 
the principle of subsidiarity at the Community level remains rather a general 
political principle than a source of explicit guidance. 
There are four conditions regulating the implementation of this principle: 1) that 
there be no exclusive Community competence; 2) that there be parallel or 
competitive competences, 3) that the objective cannot be achieved by Member 
States in a satisfactory manner and 4) that the objective, due to scale or effects 
designed, can be better accomplished at Community level.   
The importance of the subsidiarity principle is reasserted by means of a resolution 
by the European Parliament on 18 November 1992 and was afterwards taken over 
in the form of a declaration by the European Council in Edinburgh in December of 
the same year. Edinburgh Declaration emphasizes the obligation to minimize 
financial and administrative tasks for the Member States relating them 
proportionate to the objective accomplished: "Subsidiarity is a dynamic concept 
which allows the extension of the Community action when circumstances require 
so, and reversely, which rejects when it is not justified ". This means that the 
decision will be made at a level which ensures maximum efficiency of the set 
objective. 
The Council, the Commission and the European Parliament enacted an 
Interinstitutional Agreement on 25 October 1993 through which conditions for the 
implementation of the principle of subsidiarity were defined. In accordance with 
the provisions of the Agreement, the principle of subsidiarity cannot instate here 
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the “acquis communautaire”, nor the provisions regarding the powers of the 
institutions or even the institutional balance. The three EU institutions have 
engaged themselves in monitoring the observance of the principle, an annual report 
in this regard being framed by the Commission.     
An additional proof of the value ascribed to the principle of subsidiarity in the 
Maastricht Treaty is given also by the importance attached to regions. The Heads 
of State or Government have established the creation of a Committee of the 
Regions, with advisory competences, consisting of representatives of regional and 
local community.  
The second phase of the subsidiarity principle recognition process is the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, in which the provisions of the Treaty of Maastricht on this matter are 
not modified, however includes an annexed Protocol1 on implementing principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality. According to this protocol, the principle of 
subsidiarity does not put forward the issue of competences brought to the 
Community, still it includes only some instructions on how to exercise the powers 
in terms of the objectives set out in the Treaty, establishes the obligations of the 
European institutions for compliance and enforcement of subsidiarity, all these 
aiming at approaching the decision-making process to citizens and to help 
identifying the best level of administrative and legislative action that takes place 
within the Union. 
Nevertheless, behind the apparent consensus of the Member States upon 
subsidiarity - as a remedy to the problems occurring in Europe - there are 
concrete difficulties, both in theory and in practice. It can be seen that some 
states were reluctant to reopen the debate during negotiations in Amsterdam. 
The truth is that the principle of subsidiarity is not simple outline nor easy to 
implement, often its approach being ambiguous.  
On a theoretical level, the main difficulty arise from the positive or negative 
interpretation that may be given. Some authors consider the principle as a 
restricting the Union’s action only to what is necessary: a duty of non-intervention. 
Others considered mandatory for the Union to act when Member States fail: a duty 
to intervene.  
                                               
1
 The Irish Presidency proposed that Edinburgh Declaration of 1992 and the Interinstitutional 
Agreement of 1993 to be part of the Treaty, leading to the development of the annexed Protocol.  
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Also, another element which acts as a difficulty in interpreting this principle is 
time. The concept of what can be better achieved at Community level or which is 
insufficient at national level will vary over time.  
Regarding the Treaty of Nice, it does not include references to subsidiarity, which 
in our point of view is a disadvantage, with negative implications upon the interest 
of implementing this principle  
The need to clarify the division of responsibilities between Member States and the 
Union was one of the key missions of the EU Treaties, being that over time the 
Union’s nature and purposes have enlisted some developments.  
Thus, in addition to the regulation of fundamental principles applicable to division 
of powers, it was considered necessary naming not only the three categories of 
skills but also the areas where they are to be exercised, a special provision to take 
account of contingencies. In this context, are noticed some important changes in 
some areas, from one competence category to another.  
Since the moment the Treaty of Lisbon became effective the division of powers 
between the Member States and the European Union assumed a formal status. 
Articles 3, 4 and 6 of the Treaty on European Union enlist the same three types of 
competences, defining them and establishing the same areas of application.  
 
Exclusive Competences of the Union 
The Union has exclusive competence in the areas of internal market, of 
establishing competitiveness rules necessary for the functioning of internal market, 
monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the euro, of  the common 
commercial policy and the conservation of marine biological resources under the 
common fishing.  
Under some conditions, the Union is exclusively competent to conclude 
international agreements in the field of the common commercial policy. The 
extension of Union’s competence in this area is the consequence of ECJ case law 
(AETR and Open Skies cases). 
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Exclusive competences have as distinctiveness the fact that only the Union may 
legislate and adopt legally binding. Member States may themselves not do so, only 
if empowered by the Union or for the implementation of Union’s acts1. 
 
Shared Competences between Member States and the Union 
In this category of competences can be included the following areas: internal 
market, social policy, economic, social and territorial cohesion, agriculture and 
fisheries, excluding the conservation of marine biological resources, environment, 
consumer protection, transport, trans-European networks, energy, space of freedom 
security and justice and common security objectives in public health. 
In terms of shared competences, Member States exercise jurisdiction to the extent 
that the Union has not exercised its own or to the extent that the Union has decided 
to cease exercising its own jurisdiction. This may occur when EU institutions 
decide to repeal a legislative act, in particular to ensure a better and constant 
observance for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality2. 
 
Supporting, coordinating, supplementing competences of Union 
The areas where the Union shall carry actions to support (supporting action), 
coordinate or supplement actions are: industry, education, fostering vocations and 
youth, culture, tourism, sport and protection against disasters. Special emphasis is 
given to employment issues, adding that Member States shall coordinate their 
employment policies in the EU labor area. 
It is worth mentioning, although the Union shall hold the right to carry out 
supporting action in these areas, they are to be coordinated by Member State.  On 
these lines, it stipulates that if such competences, legally binding acts enacted by 
the Union under the provisions relating to these areas may not lead to 
harmonization of national laws in the area that may be exercised3.  
This division is an expression of the principle of subsidiarity, namly the Union 
shall act, except in areas of exclusive jurisdiction, unless the action is more 
effective than any action taken at national, regional or local.  
                                               
1
 Art. 2 (1), TFEU 
2
 Art. 2 (2), TFEU 
3
 Art. 2 (5), TFEU 
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As in the Constitutional Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty introduced two policies 
characterized by a different, specific regime: 
-  Economic and employment policy on which, according to Article 5 of the 
TFEU, Member States shall coordinate their policies within the Union.  
- Common foreign and security policy which, in accordance to Article 2 (4) 
TFEU, the Union shall have competence to define and implement, 
including to frame progressively a common defense policy . 
The progressive outlining of a common defense policy is further evidence for the 
increasing trend of political integration by developing the current European 
Security and Defense Policy (P.E.S.A./E.S.D.P.) within the P.E.S.C./C.F.S.P. It 
should be considered under this policy, the need to avoid duplication of EU 
competence over some powers of military alliances to which are part of some 
members of the Union. 
In order to keep to the principle of subsidiarity, with the coming into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, national parliaments are involved in decision making, with a 
requirement that all draft legislative act sent to the European Parliament and the 
Council to be simultaneously sent to them. They become, if possible to say, 
guardians implementing this principle. 
According to Article 4 of Protocol (no 1) on the role of national parliaments within 
the European Union, it is compulsory keeping a period of eight weeks from the 
date on which a draft legislative act being made available to national Parliaments in 
the official languages of the Union and the date the project shall be included on the 
provisional agenda of the Council for its enactment or for the enactment of a 
position under a legislative procedure. Thus exceptions are possible in cases of 
emergency. In other cases, there may be no agreement on a draft legislative act 
during those eight weeks.  
The Protocol (No. 2) on subsidiarity and proportionality requires that within eight 
weeks from the date of transmission of a draft legislative act, in the official 
languages of the Union, any national Parliament or any chamber of a national 
Parliament may address to the President of the Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission a reasoned opinion stating why it considers that the draft in question 
does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity.  
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Supposing the well-grounded opinions on the non-compliance of a draft legislative 
act with the principle of subsidiarity may represent at least one third of the votes 
allocated to national parliaments (each parliament having two votes, shared out on 
the basis of the national Parliamentary system, under a bicameral system, each of 
the two chambers has one vote (Article 7 (1), paragraph 2)), or a quarter in 
legislative projects relating  the Area of security, freedom and justice, the draft 
must be reviewed. Following such review, the Commission or, an appropriate 
group of Member States, European Parliament, the Court of Justice, the European 
Central Bank or the European Investment Bank may decide to maintain the 
proposal, or to amend or withdraw, decision which must be justified.  
Within the ordinary legislative procedure, supposing the reasoned opinions 
represent at least a simple majority of the votes of national parliaments, then the 
project must be reviewed. Following the review, the Commission also has three 
options: to maintain the proposal, to amend or withdraw it. 
Supposing the proposal is maintained, through a reasoned opinion, it should be 
justified the arguments through which the proposal assorts with the subsidiarity 
principle. This reasoned opinion, as well as those of the national parliaments will 
be submitted to the Union legislator in order to be taken into consideration in the 
proceeding, in this manner: 
a) before concluding the first reading, the legislator (the Parliament and the 
Council) overlooks the compatibility of the legislative proposal with the 
principle of subsidiarity, taking particular account of the reasons expressed 
and shared by the majority of national parliaments and the Commission’s 
reasoned opinion ; 
b) if, by a majority of 55% of the members of the Council or a majority of the 
votes cast in the European Parliament, the legislator considers that the 
legislative proposal is not compatible with the principle of subsidiarity, it 
will not be examined. 
Within the protocol (no. 2) article 5, is also enlisted the obligation of grounding the 
draft legislation in relation to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
These shall include a statement which allows assessing the compliance with the 
two principles and the reasons leading toa conclusion that achieving an objective is 
better achieved at Union level should rest upon qualitative whenever it is possible 
and quantitative indicators. Equally, at the observance the principle of subsidiarity 
also contributes the mandatory consultation of the European Parliament, the 
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Council and the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social 
Committee in all cases expressed within the treaties and where necessary. 
Unfortunately, their opinion is advisory both when enquired and when issued of its 
own initiative.  
There is also a compulsion mechanism. Article 5 of the Protocol (no 2) enlists the 
competence of the Court of Justice of the European Union to voice in terms of 
actions relating to breach of the principle of subsidiarity as set out by the 
Committee of the Regions regarding the acts for whose enactment, the treaties 
oblige the consultation of Members States in accordance with their national law, on 
behalf of their national Parliament or a chamber of the latter  
 
4. Conclusions 
Due to the regulation and historical development, the European construction 
develops contradictions as well, given that through its declared and recognized 
character by the rest of the subjects of public international law it is seen and 
remains an international organization, while the pursued objective and the actions 
undertaken behave as a whole. In this case, when in the presence of contradictions, 
the subsidiarity is a solution able to defuse tension, to improve the efficiency of 
system activity, particularly inside the European structures and maintain the 
balance. 
Looking at the competitive competences of Member States and those of EU, the 
effective exercise of regulatory power of a state, the subsidiarity lies under a 
suspensive term, in so far as priority is given to the European regulation without it 
being lost in its substantiality and the prerogatives it holds, firstly jus imperii, 
which means authoritarian regulation (Predescu:2001, p.105). 
Like the majority of European solutions, the subsidiarity is more of a de facto case, 
than de jure, being in accordance with cautious pragmatism which describes the 
European development model.  
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